Contra Shannon Sullivan, who argues: "that Merleau-Ponty's account of the anonymous body is not merely tacitly masculinist but is, moreover, solipsistic and dominating in import. She claims that by assuming, like Merleau-Ponty, that the body is neutral or generic, and that my perception is thus the same as another's, I effectively privilege myself as the site of perception"
AND
"that a "common ground" cannot be pregiven but is something we must strive for, especially through dialogue; for "there are no shortcuts provided by the body."2l"

Kruks argues:
"There are, self-evidently, certain dimensions to embodiment that most (though not all) human beings share irrespective of such differentia as sex, gender, race, or nationality."

"Unlike dogs, we see in color, for example, while the forward placement of our eyes precludes us from seeing as far behind us as most birds do. Our senses of scale and speed are a function of our size and the speed of the human gait-the latter being much faster than that of a tortoise, but slow in comparison to a rabbit.23 We cannot navigate by smell as some species can, have limited night vision, and so on."

"Such differentia are not merely biological "facts." Nor are they trivial. These invariants of hl!man embodiment structure our experiences such that we may recognize other human beings as sharing similar (though not identical) experiences to our own. If I see somebody running for a bus, struggling under a heavy load, or reaching to remove an object from a high shelf, for example, I will "know" roughly what it feels like. I will do so not through a process of rational construction, but prereflectively, through the immediacy of anonymous embodiment, through the prepersonal body as it runs through me."

"Likewise, I may immediately recognize another's most basic emotions as expressed in her or his body: if I see somebody weeping, that person's body will immediately communicate her or his grief to me.24"

"the prepersonal body"
"an indeterminate constancy," cf. Carol Bigwood

"But there do seem to be some "constant indeterminacies" of feminine embodiment within Western culture that offer similar experiences to women whose lives are also very different. For example, norms of privacy operate to present menstruation as a problem for women in Western societies, irrespective of their social class or their race. Moreover, the embodied temporality of menstruation is generally experienced as incommensurable with the temporal regime of the "normal" working and school day."